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1 abstract
In this paper, we first review some basic concepts associated with a model for
social interaction previously proposed by us. Each agent is seen as an array of
variables that can be found in different states. The agents are then allowed to
interact and form groups based on their variables. We discuss how spin-glass
type physics may be appropriate for our model. Several types of variables and
costs associated with flipping the variables are discussed. Then some simple
graphs are presented to understand the formation of various levels of identities
within social clusters. In the end, we analyze events from the French revolu-
tion and the Russian revolution to to understand how different variables and
identities interact within a hierarchical social structure.
2 Introduction
Complexity in organization has lately been a field of intense study (Gellmann
2002; Wolfram 1995). Models of interacting systems have been applied to many
real-world situations such as to predict market behavior (Black and Scholes
1973).
In social context too, interaction among agents is decisive in forming orga-
nizations. Models treating each agent as a point in a graph have been used to
study connectivity in social networks (eg. Newman et. al. 2001). However,
the relationship between agents in the social context is not simple. Bonds can
be formed and dissolved. Although each agent is an individual, he is connected
with others within more complicated structures. In matter, larger structures
of identity can often be reformed by interchanging a component with a similar
one, but in the case of human societies, the complexity of each of the members
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make the dynamics more interesting, because the unique individual needs to be
counted for within the context of an ensemble as well.
Previously (Shafee 2002; Shafee 2004; Shafee 2005), we have proposed a
model regarding interacting heterogeneous agents, giving rise to organizations
and notions of self at various levels. In this paper, we review and summarize
the basic concepts of our proposed model. We then fit the concepts in terms of
real world scenarios. We observe how societies evolve and irrational behaviors
emerge from interaction among variable states with time as the number of agents
in a cluster changes.
3 Interactions and Irrationality
Conventional economics tries to predict the market and human behavior based
on the assumption of rationally behaving agents dealing with one another in
ways to maximize their own utility curves. However, in an imperfect world,
irrationality exists. Phenomena like war and spite contradict rational norms.
In conventional economics, a mathematical formulation involving equations
for relevant variables is based on a set of needs for possible trades depending
on supplies and demands of individuals. However, these clean relations yielding
plots with distinct points of intersection displaying stable points or well-defined
positions and payoffs fail to explain the so-called irrational states that often
spread from one ill-defined point to large-scale social volatility, herd mechanism
and fanaticism. The difference of perceptions in individuals in individuals is
well recognized (Hume, 1777) and may play a role.
Recently (Ostrom 1997), it has been shown that in complex organizations,
an individual often makes decisions that are contradictory to optimal Nash
equilibria. The author also discussed how repeated games failed to teach the
individual what the game theoretic optimal strategy is. Rather, increased com-
munication often led to trust and caused the player to contribute more to the
pool of commons.
In this paper, we try to formulate less than rational behavior in a more rigor-
ous manner, which may lead to mathematical expressions for predicting social
dynamics. We examine the fine structure of human perceptions and utilities
and model possible chaotic or annealed behaviors of social lattices with coupled
variables from a point of view of interaction physics, especially the spin glass
model (Edwards Anderson 1975; Sherrington Kirkpatrick 1975). We introduce
dynamics in the identities of interacting agents and take the matching com-
ponents and contradictions into account in these identities to find complicated
behavioral patterns in interactions and dealings.
We assume that although agents can communicate to agree upon a broadly
shared idea of the world, each agent is connected to her world independently,
and gains information about the world by means of perceptions and interactions.
However, these agents are then again connected within social clusters.
In our model, the interactions among agents comprise a game of incomplete
information, where each agent can guess only partial information about the other
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agents while calculating his next move. This “transfer of information about
identity is achieved by means of repeated interactions. Hence, the information
trapped in different agents may not always be transferable to another agent.
Some of the pieces of information and preferences existing in different agents
may be conflicting, inconsistent, and may at times be genetically determined
and hence, almost permanently local to an individual agent. For example, low
levels of latent inhibition to the environment may be associated with both the
concept of genius or madness in two extreme cases (Peterson and Carson 2000).
This suggests that some people are prone to be receptive to more stimuli from
the environment and be more connected to the environment by default.
We argue that local rationality in the sense that each agent tries to maximize
the needs of his own identity may in turn give rise to irrational behavior non-
locally, and show how the grouping of various levels of identities may create
volatility.
Previously, (Shafee 2002; Shafee 2004; Shafee 2006), various aspects of an
interaction based identity model was discussed, and the possible effect of using
the concept of changing identities in the example of a specific hierarchical social
cluster was studied in (Shafee and Steingo 2007). The constraints in the number
of parameters expressed at a hierarchy level were discussed in (Shafee 2007)
together with the concept of semi-closed identities. In this work, we start by
comparing the notion of an identity-model based on interacting variables with
models of identity existing prior to our propositions. Then we introduce some
more detailed ideas and concepts. Next, we formulate the components of the
interaction Hamiltonian involving the variables that control the dynamics of
the system. We review different types of variables (Shafee 2004) and study the
effects of these variables at an individual and at a group level given interaction
based potentials. Finally, we study various social organizations in which agent
and group identities evolve, because of the interactions between these different
variables and observe how social organizations and dynamics originate due to
interactions.
4 Social Models Prior to Our Proposition
Although existing literature has tried to find relatedness among agents (Pep-
per 2002, Hamilton 1964, Connolly and Martlew 1999), the models are often
simplified as described below:
4.1 Models based on Genetic Similarity
Models exist to calculate match among genetically related agents (Dawkins 2006,
Pepper 2000). However, recent mappings of the human genome have shown
that human beings are genetically 99.9 percent similar (International Human
Genome Sequencing Consortium 2001) and sometimes members of two isolated
clusters may have more overall genetic matching than members of the same
cluster [e.g. broad genetic difference in blood groups within the same group of
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people]. Despite this statistics, evidences of altruism and affiliation can be found
within ethnic, social and cultural groups (e.g. see Bowles and Gintis 2004), and
specific minuscule differences in genetic structure sometimes have large-scale
expressions in interactions with the environment and other agents. Examples
are: single mutations in one gene leading to deadly diseases like Huntingtons
disease (Imarisio et al 2008), and small mutation differences resulting in the
broad expression of the type of melanocyte. Then again, a large percent of DNA
remains as non-coding DNA or junk DNA in eukaryotic cells (Ohno 1972).
4.2 Networks based on Homogenous Agents
The structures of social clusters and graphs have become a field of study recently
(see e.g. White and Reichardt 2007; Gastner and Newman 2006; Newman et
al 2001; Barabasi and Reka 1999). However, detailed analysis of psychological
and social causes leading to the fine structures of the clustering has not been
performed. The studies of social networks and the field of psychology and
relatedness leading to clustering, therefore, remain disjoint.
In some papers (Bowles 2004; Gintis 2003b), the so called group or pro-
social emotions are mentioned, but the findings related to group emotions in
non-genetically related clusters remain restricted to observation, and calcula-
tions of economic group stability assume that pro-social emotions are prepro-
grammed (Bowles 2004) or are parts of reciprocity between individuals (Bowles
and Gintis 2003). However, no detailed explanation for these existing emotions
was provided, though they were taken as traits that favored the existence of a
group. The dynamics of such emotions was not studied either.
5 Encompassing Ideas into One Model
These isolated and sometimes conflicting models can be incorporated into a
larger model if some new observations are made and applied. Identity is not
static. Extreme cases of the same person undergoing drastic personality changes
can be observed after brain lesions or injury of the brain due to accidents (see
e.g. Raitu 2004). Other physiological changes due to hormones etc. may also
cause personality shifts (Schulkin 1999). Mundane isolated interactions with an
individual indicate time and experience gaps changing a personality, although a
broad group of tags may remain constant, as well as shared memories. The ideas
of continuity and changes within a person might be validated by his experiences,
where the past rationally precedes the present, to update his preferences. How-
ever, to another person observing the first person with gaps of time and space
between the two snapshots of the same person the change might not appear
rational.
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5.1 Expression of Variables
In (Shafee 2007), the expression of parameters at different levels of a complex
system was explored. Complexity and identity can be organized at various
levels, where lower levels of complexity are contained within a higher level in
a hierarchical fashion. So, the components of a complex system are contained
within the system at lower levels of identity. For example, the components of an
agent, such as various organs are contained within him at a lower level so that
the result of the interactions among the components is expressed at the higher
human level, creating characteristics typical of human interactions. Similarly,
the complexity of a cluster derives from the organization and interaction of
its component agents. Macroscopic average differences between clusters, and
also finer differences among agents within these clusters indicate that there are
some constraints and choices regarding how many variables can be expressed
at each interaction level (Shafee 2007). Here the scale determines the nearest
neighbors and the range of interactions. So, each level will have a time scale
for interactions as well as a space scale. The concept of scale with respect to
complexity has been discussed in (Ahl and Allen 1996).
5.2 Interconnectedness
Different variables and states defining persons are sometimes complementary,
and may also be mutually exclusive (contradictory), when placed together or
allowed to interact. However, within each agent the variables that define an
agent are connected together. Hence, when two agents interact, their matching
and contradictory variables are introduced at the same time.
5.3 Changing Priorities
The priorities or weights assigned to a preference or a piece of knowledge by
an agent is important and sometimes often modifiable. The introduction of a
certain environment which is harmful may change an agent’s priorities so that
protection against that new environmental state must come first if the agent
is to exist. As the agent ages his biological parameters change and priorities
are redefined as well. Again, priorities vary from agent to agent depending on
the agent’s local environment and the agent’s personal taste. The introduction
of risk factors in future possibilities may also cause agents to choose different
priorities depending on whether the agent is risk prone or risk averse. The degree
of security and risk sought by an agent may also vary depending on personal
and environmental situations and factors such as responsibility for other agents
who might be genetic dependents. As agents acquire more information and
experience, priorities may change as well due to possible future predictions.
5.4 Interactions and Updates
Interactions among different types of traits have various degrees of stiffness and
their interrelatedness often cause interesting dynamics (see Shafee 2004 for an
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example). The resistance to change preserves an identity, while change favors
adapting to a new set of connections. Adaptation is possible because of the
existence of many possible suppressed states within the agent (for example, a
large part of the genetic code in the human genome is not expressed. Again,
specific environments may trigger genetic expressions. see Gobbs 2003, Hasler
2007). The identity of an agent is derived from an idea of continuation so that
modifications are made subject to some degree of stiffness and some constant
states.
Interactions of agents with the environment provide them with information
and the introduction of new environments may cause agents to modify some
tastes or preferences as well (for example, changing the language of expression,
food habit). Again, a sense of identity derived from interaction among agents
may cause agents to modify their preferences. A simple example is seasonal
fashion where an agent modifies her preference for clothes to fit into a group by
interacting with other agents.
5.5 Level of Complexity and Fuzziness
In a recent paper (Shafee 2009), the relation of the level of complexity with the
fuzziness of the identity was discussed. At higher levels of complexity, the exact
number of total components at the lowest levels is not defined since overlap
and interactions among components create not a point but a band of stability.
For example, in a hadron, exactly three quarks form a more or less shielded,
localized point of near stability. However, in a larger human being, comprising
many quarks, within many atoms that make up the organs connected together,
the spatial extension and mass occur only within a viable range and not with
a specific value. The difference in shielding, and possible interactions with
neighboring structures and a connected environment may also contribute to
changing semi-stability as complexity level changes.
5.6 Connection with the Environment
Interactions of the agents with the environment may cause the inter-agent inter-
actions to change as well. In (Shafee 2002) an axiom based game was constructed
where an agent played against other agents and also the environment. Both
agents and the environment were provided with identities so that each player
tried to align the other player along his most optimal direction. The vastness of
the environment was matched with the number of agents playing together, and
situations like flipping of axioms based on conversion were introduced.
The degree of match between two agents’ axioms thus provides a measure
of the total effort expended by agents in a coherent manner against the envi-
ronment. Hence, the number of agents sharing an axiom or preference gives a
measure of that axiom’s strength when playing against the environment. The
axioms placed in a social network may be attributed an identity distributed
among agents, and any bond among agents sharing an axiom would strengthen
that axiom with respect to the environment.
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6 The Physics of Interaction Dynamics
The analogy between spins and interacting variable (component) states in agents
can be used to formulate detailed social dynamics.
A basic interaction potential using spin glass type interactions ( see Edwards
Anderson 1975; Sherrington Kirkpatrick 1975) is given by:
H = −Jabij s
a
i s
b
j − h
asai (1)
Here Jabij is the measure of coupling between attributes a and b between
agents i and j; sai and s
b
i are the given variable states. h
a is the component of
the environment interacting with attribute a. The interaction Hamiltonian H
determines the net forces at play on each independent variable.
In (Shafee 2009), we will be modifying this basic spin glass equation by
taking properties of social interactions into account and then form a master
dynamical equation. In this paper, we explore our model qualitatively in terms
of some specific social scenarios in order to validate the assumptions taken into
account.
The use of a spin-glass type model is validated by noting that the system
concerned is dynamic and is dependent on interactions among variables of differ-
ent agents. These variables can exist in different states, and interactions can flip
the state of a variable in order to minimize the potential of the system consisting
of many parts. Similar models of complex systems depending on interactions
between parts have been proposed (Hopfield 1975)
However, each agent is a complex entity with many variables. Hence, the
interaction Hamiltonian H is somewhat similar to an anisotropic Heisenberg
Hamiltonian in the sense that we have two arrays with different component
values (variables in different states) interacting and the minimization of total
energy in an energy landscape is the asymptotic goal. However, as the number
of variable-states is increased, numerous local minima arise and fluctuations
(noise) and sudden changes (including sharp changes in the environment and
mutations) contribute to instability of the network in a local minimum. We call
it an anisotropic Heisenberg model because the components of the vector do not
have the same metric or weights in coupling together.
7 Identity Units and Modified Utilities
As described previously, each complex identity unit i can be expressed as a lo-
calized coupled set of attributes a (comprising many lower levels of attributes
that may not all have a net expression). Interactions among those coupled vari-
ables produce local interaction potential minima in the Hamiltonian function,
and hence a degree of stability that is robust to some degree against outside
interactions that tend to raise this local interaction potential. The concept of
identity is thus related to the continuation of local interaction minima existing
on different scales, with robustness deriving from each local minimum compris-
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ing much smaller strongly coupled minima contained within the structure in a
complex manner.
7.1 Identity of an Agent
Theories about how an agent perceives his own traits differently from the traits
of others exist in current psychology literature (see Klein et al 2004, for ex-
ample). Such theories justify our notion of interacting agents with variables in
different states.
An agent’s identity is also dependent on the persistence of a memory, which is
a sequence of correlated events (see, for example, Raaijmakers 1979, Raaijmakers
and Shiffrin 1981) that are past interactions between the agent’s existing states
and the states of other agents or the environment. In human memory, certain
events can produce cues (Padilla-Walker and Poole, 2002). Memories, thus,
can be seen as change of states (in neuron connections), such that a specific
interaction can send a cue to stimulate the memory of another set of interactions
or a changed state. So memories can be seen as states within the agent that act
as an interface between the agent’s own states and the environment ( or other
agents).
Hence, an agent’s identity derives from the balance of being able to choose a
future, given a locally preserved known past (see Palis 2002 for a discussion) in
order to reach the most optimal interaction potential possible, and the stiffness
to change i.e. to preserve its current states and couplings.
However, the reactions evoked within an agent based on past interactions,
which can be seen as part of the agent’s identity, come in segments (Raaijmakers
and Shiffrin 1981). Instead of calculating long chains of consecutive events, short
segments are correlated to evoke instantaneous reactions. Repeated exposure
to a sequence conditions a reflex (Pavlov 1927) which is a measure of correlated
sequence clauses. Hence, segments of correlated interactions become part of the
agent as programmed instantaneous reactions, while calculating a large chain of
events requires time and energy. Stochastic measure of immediate interactions
and retrieved specific long chains of events give rise to the agent’s perception of
short term and long term identity and utility. Similarly constructing actions for
short and long term futures that are optimal require predicting highly correlated
sequences, and probabilistic segments in a chain, involving risk factors.
The current state space of an agent is a function of his genetic design and also
his past interactions. So the uniqueness of the agent derives from the uniqueness
of his local past and also the uniqueness in genetic make-up. Even if two identical
twins might have exactly the same genetic make-up, their uniqueness appears
from separate local pasts that are stored within modified states.
7.2 Identity of a Cluster
An agent is part of a cluster of agents, and the identity of the cluster is created
by taking into account the dynamics and constituents of the cluster. While the
components of the cluster, which is the aggregate of the behavior of the agents
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is expressed as the characteristic of the cluster itself, membership in a cluster
puts an individual agent within a group of interacting agents, and a common
environment. The interaction of other agents with the environment modifies the
environment of the agent as well, and shared resources and the requirement for
collaboration and communication also makes the other agents prone to convert
the agent along their own preferences. The need for an agent to collaborate
with others for one of his preferences may cause another one of his preferences
to be in connection with dissimilar states of other agents causing some of his
own preferences to change to match others’.
The organization and size of a cluster and its stability may have a large de-
gree of variability compared to the degree of fuzziness possible for an agent, and
clusters also may display many degrees of complexity (subclasses), starting with
simple family units and then expanding to complex social structures with labor
distribution and differentiation, yet accounting for its components’ individual
identities. The exchange of components between cluster may be subject to more
complexity and plasticity because of the spread and nature of adhering forces
for a cluster and the degrees of freedom possessed by the component agents.
The agents in a cluster form bonds of matching variables, and also bonds of
complementary symbiosis within that larger identity. However, the agents own
identity is reflected in his membership of the larger cluster because the agent
would identify with other agents with similar variables. Hence, the agent’s own
affinities with other agents would in turn give rise to cluster identities that would
exhibit these binding parameters on a larger scale.
7.3 Modification of Utility Functions
A trust-based departure from Nash equlibria (Ostrom 1997) can be explained by
modifying the utility function for an individual. Our model takes into account
a broad range of similarity based interactions to construct an extended notion
of self (Shafee 2004), and the agent is rational in the sense that he tries to
maximize the utility of this weighted idea of self he fits himself within.
The individual utility function can get distorted because of this affinity fac-
tor, as the corrected utility would be the utility of the individual modified by a
weighted utility of an affinity group. The affinity factor will reflect an agent’s
perception of other agents’ variable states. It is interesting to note that the
agents may or may not have knowledge of the proper state of these variables.
Therefore, each variable in an agent has an actual value, and also a value per-
ceived by the other agents. So, the affinities may not be commutative (i.e. order
independent), and the gain from a perceived affinity may not be balanced by
the sharing an actual affinity.
How higher order terms come into play within any cluster and the total in-
teraction is dependent on the value of the higher order terms, and may differ
from one scenario to another based on the total number of agents, the partition-
ing of matching variables, and the weights assigned to the variables at a specific
time and place.
U = U0 + a0U1 + a1U2 + a2U3 + ... (2)
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Here U is the utility. The first term is the utility of an isolated individual
agent, while the second term is the utility from the second level affiliation of
the individual with one other agent, the third being the result of interactions
among three, and so on.
Although in some cases the basic laws of classical economics can be retrieved
in the zeroth order, when the agents are dispersed and matches are random when
higher order terms can be neglected, in many other cases higher order terms are
observed clearly as is described in the end of this paper, and in instances, a
higher order term may overshadow the first order term and lead to perplexing
actions from an individual such as altruistic sacrifices (Shafee 2009b ).
8 Defining Agent Variables
Agent variables were defined in (Shafee 2004). We broadly categorize possible
variables:
8.1 Preference Variables
An agent’s preference can be formulated as follows: The states of the environ-
ment can be imagined as a mixture of many possibilities that can collapse to only
one of many possible states with which all the agents will be connected. Hence,
an agent’s preference would be to create a chosen environment state. Now,
agents will bid for different future states that will suit their own preferences.
However, an environment may be shared by agents so that only one macroscopic
environment state is possible that needs to be shared by connected agents. The
acquisition and interaction of preference variables in a social network has been
studied (Shafee 2009).
8.2 Skill and Aptitude Variables
Inherent talent or aptitude and training both come into play in the final skill
of an agent. Although extreme cases prevail, some people cannot be trained in
certain skills even to the level of an average, whereas some people like geniuses
may excel (Johnson 2004) and produce at the top level with little or no training,
for an average person a combination of ability and training is important.
8.3 Origin of Beliefs
A belief consists of a set of initial states connected to a set of output states,
often giving rise to rules. A belief may be acquired by interaction with the
environment or by interaction with other agents. A belief may also be imag-
ined, in which case the belief with no corresponding environmental state can
be described as a set of input states that are connected with a set of output
states due to corrupt memory or mismatch within the agent. The interactions
between stiff beliefs in a coherent social networks has been studied in (Shafee
2009b).
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The emergence of these variables from the interplay between genetic maps
and interactions with the environment is studied in detail in (Shafee 2009 and
Shafee 2009b).
In (Shafee 2002), an interaction based game was proposed based on agents
sharing possibly dissimilar axioms leading to their actions. Agents interacting
with one another attempted to influence other agents by converting them to be
on their side. In (Shafee 2004), the notion of gambling and risk was discussed
to understand how beliefs can become parts of a person’s or a society’s identity,
although these beliefs may later become uncorrelated with a changed world
scenario.
9 Perceived Interactions and Actual Costs
The notion of perceived identities was defined previously. We thus differentiate
two types of interaction Hamiltonians.
Hperc is the perceived Hamiltonian, which signifies the (negative) utility per-
ceived by the agent locally, that may include virtual states as will be explained.
The actual Hamiltonian Hact excludes cues (see Raajmakers and Shiffrin 1980
for a discussion about cues) and beliefs about external states local to an agent,
that the environment cannot directly connect with.
The agent makes its moves and calculations based on his perceived inter-
action Hamiltonian, Hperc which is highly localized within the agent, though a
function of previous agent-agent or agent-environment interaction. The actual
interaction Hamiltonian Hact dictates the overall agent’s position with respect
to the current environment (i.e. the overall stability of the coupled identity
components). The terms in Hperc are dictated by the agent’s knowledge of the
environment, which may not reflect the current environment state or dynamics.
The difference between the effect of an environment state in Hperc and Hact
arises from the vastness of the environment and the many degrees of freedom
within the environment. The perception terms arise from repeated interactions
with the local environment within the agent’s interaction range, and involve
only coarse grained interactions at the same level as the agent-environment
interaction states.
Most of the time, we shall equate Hperc with Hact, except for a few excep-
tional cases where an agent’s actions will also depend on perceived hypothetical
connections.
The dynamics of perceived identities is discussed in (Shafee 2009c) and the
connections between perception and actual identities is formulated mathemati-
cally in (Shafee 2009b).
In (Shafee 2009a), more detailed mathematical formulations of variable dy-
namics is shown, including the truncation of the array of expressed variables
because of blocking (property of mutual exclusiveness) imposed on one type of
interaction by another interaction. Weights and priorities are assigned to vari-
ables as well. Here, we concentrate on the behavior of a few important expressed
variables of agents placed in groups, and see how changing various parameters
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update the identities and behavioral patterns of the groups and the individual
agents.
9.1 Weights and Priorities
The weight or priority of a variable defines the degree of interaction or the
fraction of total interactions expressed by an agent at a certain time. So, high
priority or highly weighted terms are expressed while low priority terms may not
interact or may remain suppressed. Again, it is the highly weighted variables
that count most when relationships between agents and formation of clusters
are considered.
Dynamics in the highly weighted variables, and shifts in weights are hence
vital in cluster evolution.
A detailed mathematical description of weights and weight dynamics is car-
ried out in (Shafee 2009).
10 An Agent in a Group
We now discuss some further examples that can be explained by using our
model. How these specific situations may arise by taking self-interaction cor-
rected economic theory into account will be briefly discussed here by pointing
out phenomena that may arise because of specific interaction terms. In this
paper, we present the scenarios and points of stability graphically. This is
somewhat similar to the way supply and demand curves are used to find points
of equilibrium. We will be using qualitative arguments to deduce main features
for the shapes of the graphs. These graphs represent interaction energy for
different types of variables in the y axis. The origin represents a single agent
who is the observer. In the x axis, neighbors are included in order of similarity
(the most similar agents are closer to the origin in order to minimize conflict
and hence yield low interaction energy). The actions of the agent (eg. his for-
mation of identities) are given by the combined interaction potentials. Minima
formed in the total interaction energy with increasing neighbors indicate forma-
tion of group identities. Although, in this paper, we will be using qualitative
arguments to define the shapes of each of the energy curves, it is possible to
predict them phenomenologically by parameterizing a system in the same man-
ner it is possible to formulate precise supply and demand curves in conventional
economics.
10.1 Collaborative and Competing Variables in a Group
We have defined identities at the individual agent level as well as the group level.
The variables of each agent also interact within the agent, with other locally
coupled variables, and with the variables of other agents and the environment.
The interaction of a variable with the environment may change (flip) an environ-
ment state to one that is more energetically favorable. Therefore, such flipped
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environment states satisfy a preference of the agent. When an agent is placed in
a group in a common environment, preferences of different agents interact with
the same environment. However, the basic premise of game theory (Nash 1950)
and equilibrium of supply and demand in macroeconomics acknowledge and
show how multiple agents competing for a common resource compete against
one another to reach various equilibria. Hence, some preferences may be such
that the introduction of multiple agents may foster competition. Interaction
among agents with such variables are mediated by a common environment, and
result of interaction would depend on the scarcity imposed by the second agent.
This competition term is similar to the result of multi-agent behavior found in
conventional economics. The other terms involving collaborative interactions
and interactions in terms of genetic similarity or similarity in belief show up as
corrections to the expected rational behavior. Hence, the correction imposed
by our interaction based similarity model appear as superposed peaks that take
into account utility (in the form of low interaction energy) from interaction
among matching variables among agents.
Figure 1: The effect of various types of variables within the agent’s interaction
potential
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Figure 2: The problem of choosing an identity group within a large homogeneous
population when collaboration requires a subset of the population
10.2 Defining Types of Interactions in Clusters
Since each agent is a complex entity with many variables in possibly different
states, in a large group of agents, similar and dissimilar variables exist together
within an interconnected network. The vast number of variables make it impos-
sible to have two agents that are completely similar or dissimilar, or create an
absolute indicator for closeness between two agents. Similarity in one variable
between two agents does not make them absolute friends, and some similar vari-
able states can be found even among people who can be attributed as enemies.
We thus have a weaving of similarity bonds among agents giving rise to the
non-transitivity of friendship. The weight of a variable and the dynamics of the
weight of a variable determine who are closer at a certain time.
The measure of closeness or the extension of the concept of self is not absolute
because of the existence of competing similar and dissimilar variables and the
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constraints of resources. As the number of agents increase within an ecosystem,
needs for collaboration vary, and diversity in states increase. The constraints
in resources and energy also put a limit to friends that can be accommodated.
Hence, societies may split and friends may become enemies.
We discuss how the total number of agents, N , determines the macroscopic
behavior of a cluster as N is increased slowly, starting with a group of a few
agents that are matching in a few variables and mismatching in some others.
We also observe the effect of weighted match in the macroscopic behavior of the
cluster and the creation of sub-clusters.
We take into account the leading highly weighted variables of each agent
to study his formation of bonds and identities. We also observe how the mix
of competing and collaborating variables, together with variables that show a
continuous degree of match contribute to interesting dynamics.
Let us take agents Si such that
Si = [s
1
i , s
2
i , s
3
i .....] (3)
Only highly weighted components of the self-array of agent i are expressed
in the interactions, and we observe how these expressed terms affect the macro
interactions.
To start with a simple picture, let us assume that there are only m highly
weighted variables. Of these, we define s1i as a survival variable, so that the
agents must compete to connect these with the environment. For example, it
can be food, so that connections to food has a very high weight. However, if
more agents are introduced in the picture, each agent has less food and the
term s1i .h
1, which is the connection of an agent with a food, can occur only
less frequently since other agents need to connect with all available food states.
Such food states, after interaction, are converted into unusable smaller states, so
that the total number of available food states would determine the availability
of food to an agent. The high weight of s1a, is fixed, and would require the agent
to find a food state with a high frequency. So, the introduction of more agents
would it uncomfortable for agent i with respect to competition based survival
terms such as s1i .
The next three variables are markers and preferences that the agents may
be in matching or mismatching positions from agent to agent forming matching
bonds. Let us assume that s2i is genetically fixed, and the other two are in state
0 or 1 with a certain flipping cost.
Let S6i be a skill based collaboration variable. For simplicity, we now assume
that all agents have the same skill level. However, a collaboration withN ′ agents
is required for the production of MP6 , the optimal environment. Hence, S
6
n.h
(the interaction of S6n with the matching component of h, the environment) will
have a peak when N ′ agents are introduced in the neighborhood. Such a peak
may result from an optimum value of collaborators for the production of the
related skill-based item. This peak can be a Gaussian with the top at Nskill
that also has a cut-off so that it falls to zero if Nskill < Nthresh. This signifies
that less than Nthresh agents collaborating will yield no macro output.
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10.3 Expression and Suppression of Variables in Cluster
Dynamics
If N , the number of agents, is small, fewer agents compete for a fixed amount
of food. In this case, it is possible to have the contribution of the competitive
term, s1 , decrease slowly in the interaction landscape as N increases. The term,
smN , may require N agents with mismatching variables to collaborate, so that
the state MPm can be created. If the yield of MPm interacting with a certain
variable of an agent is large compared with the effects of the other mismatching
terms lumped together, a peak will occur near N and N agents, even though
mismatching in attributes, will collaborate and find a common identity based
on mutual need in SmN . Hence, it is possible to observe friendship between di-
verse agents when placed in an environment where collaboration effect is large
and the total number of agents available for collaboration is small. However, as
the number of agents is increased with a few expressed parameters within the
cluster, splits within the cluster can be observed. An example can be diverse
and even conflicting ethnic groups forming bonds to collaborate against a com-
mon enemy by forming an alliance when coherent mutiny or non-cooperation
is needed to fight against a common enemy. If the weight of the collaboration
term is high, the ethnic tags and cultural differences (which are the middle
three terms in the array just described) will gain low weight and can remain
suppressed. An example can be the formation of a common black identity in
many colonial countries where many conflicting tribes formed alliance. However,
when collaboration is not needed or the common enemy is removed, so that the
last parameter requiring collaboration is taken away, the first parameter, where
competition among individuals for food is expressed gains prominence and the
collaboration can fall apart, creating subclusters based on the previously unim-
portant parameters, which can be genetic tags or certain cultural distinctions.
A case study of the breakdown of black identity in South Africa was discussed
(Shafee and Steingo 2008).
Another interesting example would be several ethnic groups being grouped
together by socialism, so that a coherent culture is superficially created sup-
pressing individualism. The inertia acting for and against flipping to individual
ethnic identities and keeping coherence can be modeled mathematically as fol-
lows:
The suppression of individual identity can be brought about by the need to
collaborate to cater to the basic preferences. It can be furthered by the achieve-
ments leading to security produced by collective group production. However,
the inertia against a state of mass unification is posed by genetic taste, genetic
identification among sub-clusters and kinship, and mismatch between preferred
job accounting for personal preferences and ability together with opportunity
and optimal job for the society based on ability and optimal efficient need. His-
torically, the rise of socialism has been observed when the fragmentation of a
society leads to breakdown of economies, or when a large unskilled population
that is scattered is needed to come together and collaborate to a significant de-
gree to forcibly introduce collaboration and investment of skills for the greater
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good of a group (see Marx and Engels 1998 for a discussion of the communist
manifesto to bring together un-united workers for needed large scale collabora-
tion in a fragmented and frustrated society) and frustration about socialism and
the breakdown of socialism causing even genocides and ethnic cleansing have
been observed when socialism is efficient in the sense that the total production
of the society exceeds the bare minima and creates security for the entire society
against other societies (see Remnick 1994 for the collapse of communism due to
frustration about individual identities).
10.4 Increase in Variable Numbers in Cluster Dynamics
Let us include more preference expressed variables in each agent so that
S [s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, ....sm,
∑
sb : (b > m)] (4)
The term
∑
sb is a background component formed by adding up all the
remaining newly introduced variables in the agent. We assume that the weights
of these terms are lower than the weights of the first five terms so that all these
new terms can form a background. If N , the number of agents, is increased,
given the condition that each agent differs from the others at a few random
places in
∑
sb, an undefined arrangement of subgroups can be seen for the
following reasons:
The existence of competition due to s1 and the need for collaboration because
of Sm would tend to define the size of sub-clusters that can act as surviving
units. However, bonds between matching preferences and repulsion between
mismatching preferences would tend to be defining factors about which agents
should be grouped together. N (the number of interacting agents) and the
number of mismatching random preferences can be chosen such that an agent
is on an average the same degree of mismatching from any other agent, but the
mismatching would arise in different preference sites. Since most preferences
can be switched at some cost, the fixed matching state would be s2, which
is genetically fixed, and the degree of match or closeness in s2 would produce
semi-stable clusters. These would fluctuate because of the changing effects of the
other preferences and the small size of a sub-cluster where the second term has a
large degree of match. If the number of agents required for collaboration is larger
than the sub-cluster formed by matching the second term, but still much smaller
than the total number of agents found in the entire cluster, the total number
of agents required for collaboration can be unstable or unviable. Attempts
to increase membership based on the genetic kinship term may increase the
total number of agents within the cluster as each kinship subunit extends its
membership. This might lead to scarcity, making the repulsive competition
term much steeper, causing large degrees of competition for resources within the
cluster. The attempts to include random members of the cluster to build these
preference sub-clusters might be unstable because of the lack of diversity within
the cluster. As a result, the average match of any two agents disregarding the
genetic match is about the same, and any member can be replaced with another
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member from the large cluster. This situation can lead to the instability of the
preference sub-clusters.
Now let us assume that instead of random slight mismatch, we have specific
variables that can be mismatched, while keeping the rest of the variables steady.
So each agent has a property array
Si = [s
1
i , s
2
i , s
3
i , s
4
i , s
5
i , ...s
m
i
∑
sb] (5)
And in the total cluster, N ′ agents have, due to the newly introduced back-
ground, a pool of aggregate variable states
∑
i=1..N ′
sbi (6)
These newly added variable components change only to contribute a back-
ground noise and the effects of more prominent terms like s1 can be studied by
superposition of the interaction due to s1i onto a background.
10.5 Subgroup Competition in Scarcity
As the population, N , goes up, it is possible to form larger group identity
subclusters within the initial group, each subgroup attaining an identity due to
marked difference in a highly weighted variable. Let us say, for example, that
s3 has a high weight after s1 and sm.
It is possible to divide N into subgroups depending on s3iM if it exists in
two distinct separate states because of historical mixing of two populations
or mutations or separate histories created because of long-lasting ideological
differences. If they are all in the same environment, the once friendly agents
may now form their own competing subgroups, who are rivals (Flint, 2006). Let
us denote two subgroups, A and B, comprising agents such that each agent also
comprises an array of variables within the cluster:
A = [A1, A2, ....] (7)
Ai = [s
1
Ai
, s2Ai , 0, s
4
Ai
, s5Ai , s
m
Ai
,
∑
b
sbAi ]etc. (8)
Each of these subgroups will attain an identity that is dependent on the
value of s3Xi (X = A,B), given the other values produce random noise with a
low weight.
When still contained within the same cluster because of the availability of
resources and opportunities, this type of splitting will create two different iden-
tities within the same cluster that may compete for the common resources. The
coexistence of two identities that need to share the same resources would create
competition within the cluster. Let us assume that the total population of the
entire cluster is slightly less optimal for the total resources available, so that the
total resources cannot cater to all the agents properly. In that case, the survival
competition term will be steep if all agents are combined, but may not be steep
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if only one subgroup exists, while the collaboration term would require a num-
ber between one and two subgroups. If the skills required for proper utilization
of the resources are spread within the two sub-clusters so that no sub-cluster
can utilize the resource properly, the polarization based on identities may cause
inefficiency in utilizing the resources. Each of the subgroups tries to exclude
the other to keep the survival competing term less steep, but may need certain
agents from the other subgroup to properly utilize the resources. This situation
may create clan strife within the cluster, or the need to find a common identity
to suppress the split of the cluster. Forcible nationalism or socialism to suppress
divisions among such clusters consisting of several subclusters may again lead
to frustration in individuals if superficial common identities (Remnick 1994).
These subgroups will then form a unit that will compete for the resources
for their own conflicting preferences. As competition gets tough, Nskill may
go up as more skill is needed to obtain the same resource under competition.
So, each group may alternately try to increase members within itself in order
to become self-sufficient in skill, and then exclude the other subgroup from the
common resource. Examples can be given of rivalry between almost similar
ethnic groups in highly populated areas with scarce resources (Ahmed 1991;
Bhabani and Becker 1999).
10.6 Stability of Subgroups in a Large Population
Another limit point would be a large population where many preference collab-
oration groups are possible. However, the match-based energy landscape has
no single distinct marker or step; so these groups can have members exchanged
without incurring a high cost.
As a result, agent i’s possible identity group, which has agent j in it, might be
different from agent js possible identity group. It is then possible for each agent
to have more than one preference identity group, with agents interchanged, if
two possible identity groups (Each containing N agents needed for preference
P are almost homogenous, but only N agents are needed for preference P .) In
that case including the N +m th agent will have a diminishing effect, but the
N th agent can be chosen from more than one candidate. In these circumstances,
highly volatile groups will form, and stable matching, such as genetic kinship
will have a longer stability because although other preferences can change, these
stay fixed. With genetic kinship fixed, and the need to have N agents for
preference P -based identity, the agent will have an urge for a larger number
of genetic kinship-based collaborators. So, societies of this type, where there
is a large degree of random mismatching in many variables, with no certain
distinct markers, large families will be formed and there will be a tendency to
retain family members in collaboration projects. If there are less than N kinship
members available, the preference based identity clusters will be volatile. This
situation can be somewhat similar to large degrees of ethnic nepotism in slightly
diverse high population areas (Vanhanen 1999, Ahmed 1991)
The competition to increase the share of each group, and to enhance the size
of the group in order to have a larger fractional share, leads to a higher total
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N1 
change in interaction 
potential due to mismatched variable
point of stable cluster due to match 
of preference collaboration size and 
distinct subclusters with mismatched variables
Figure 3: Almost stable group identities deriving from coinciding collaboration
utility and matching subcluster size
population and a more acute severity of the scarcity in a manner matching the
Tragedy of the Commons (Garrett 1968).
11 A Specific Case Study
11.1 Analysis of Characteristics of the Russian and the
French Revolution
In this section, we analyze and compare two major episodes of history to qual-
itatively see how using a variable-state interaction based social model is ap-
propriate in fitting many social phenomena. We especially note the emergence
and evolution of identity classes and their interactions, as well as stages of so-
cial stability and new social identities reached as a result of these interactions.
We especially note how collaboration clusters are formed, and how numbers
and similarity factors become important in the formation of such energetically
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Figure 4: Three different match interaction terms summing up to almost con-
stant background potential. Genetic kinship has been neglected.
favorable identity units. Facts used in this section can be checked at (Sakwa
1999; Crankshaw 1978; Ascher 1994; Medvedev 1979; Fischer 2001; Perrie 1976;
Redkey 1958; Alexandrov 1966; Carlyle 2002; Furet 1995)
The two specific examples we will use here are the formation of the USSR
and the French revolution. Although both had some similar features, leading to
the collapse of ancien regime the outcome in one led to the communist regime,
while in another, a republic was created that also saw periods of different types
of political identity later.
The ancien regime was characterized by marked stiff social hierarchy with
the monarch holding absolute power over enacted laws. Hence, identity classes
in the society were separated, although as not markedly segregated with ethnic
tags as in the case of South African apartheid. However, in the case of Russia,
ethnic divisions and conflicts also took place in an inhomogeneous society.
The identity segregation into sub-clusters within the societies in ancien
regime was based on position that usually passed down the bloodline of families
and not large ethnic subclasses. Monarchs were challenged by contesters, and
wars broke out between contending bloodlines, keeping much of the classes still
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segregated.
The identity of an individual hence involved an identity which was part
of an entire system with a specific overall history, and also a subclass of the
system based on its social position. A clergy class was officially placed to deify
the monarch as part of an integrated hierarchical social identity. The army
protected the monarch, making the act of questioning the authority a high risk
task, separating the identity clusters. Each identity class, thus had preassigned
economic identities as well, separated mostly by genetic lineage. Individual
interactions were concentrated within identity classes, which interacted among
themselves as large hierarchical subclasses with different identities.
Collaboration within each of these subclasses somewhat modified the cul-
tures within the subgroups, isolating one another further. In our previous graphs
of collaboration-based identities somewhat similar people formed strong iden-
tity groups to collaborate. In this case, similarity within stiff classes was often
imposed by holding members fixed for generations to pass down a culture con-
nected with the avocation. Hence, subclasses were initially formed and then
genetic kinship was correlated to avocations to create cultural subclasses that
were held together by similarity and continued to collaborate in similar avoca-
tions. The success of such such identity groups depended on the possibility of
training an average member of any cluster to perform the task related to that
cluster with at least considerable success. Such mechanism also resulted in the
formation of traditions that were seen parts of identities.
Collaboration cultures based on economic activities also modified total out-
put products and available goods within each subclass, further isolating the
subgroups. Hence, the rational behavior of an agent was somewhat dictated by
his identity class because of the shifted supply and demand possibilities within
each class. Again, it was genetic affinity and not always skill that helped main-
tain the classes that required a steady membership of large numbers of people
affixed to certain cultural subgroups. Not all monarchs were great rulers, and
not all peasants were low risk takers. However, membership within an iden-
tity class held together by genetic lineage suppressed easy mobility due to skill.
Each cultural subgroup hence had preferred skills based on the identity of the
subgroup that got expressed.
The monarchs often chose their consorts from different countries and cul-
tures because of direct foreign interactions and need for forming collaborations,
making the upper and upper-middle class culturally separate from the peas-
ants. For example, in Russia, the upper and upper middle class spoke French
and German as opposed to the peasant class speaking Russian. When the Nar-
odniks, who originated in mostly enlightened upper middle and middle class,
and sought to recruit peasants for a revolution, went to the villages, cultural
differences caused the peasants to even consider them as witches.
In both France and Russia, the revolutions and large scale social changes
started with revolts within social groups after economic woes due to war and
famine. In both societies as well, the revolution originated not within the iso-
lated peasant or working class, but either within the army, which contained
both titled officers and peasants recruited as soldiers working side by side, or
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dissatisfied upper or upper middle class. In France, a foreign financier named
Necker was a key instigator of the revolution, who proposed that taxes be im-
posed on the nobility as well, and in Russia, the Decembre Revolt was initiated
by the dissatisfied army, and the liberalization of an upper-middle class and
middle class who were dissatisfied with the monarch and prevailing conditions.
Again, the Russian revolution was fostered by the social evolution leading to
the creation of a industry based working class that had greater access to city
life, and the uprise of a professional middle class whose roots could be founded
within the peasants. The dynamics created by changed economic needs of the
society in competition with other countries caused mixing and overlap of iden-
tities fostering interaction among segregated identity groups. Lenin, who was
the leader of the Bolshevik group, that believed that the revolution must be
achieved by the industrial working class was a practising lawyer with access
to modern education and international connection who was born to a school
inspector and had mixed ethnicity originating in several countries.
In both France and Russia, the revolution took place in steps, with a number
of groups representing power to different social classes and identities challenging
the monarchy. In both countries, the revolution saw periods of unstable equilib-
rium solutions that were challenged by factions representing separate identity
groups.
In Russia, the emancipation of serfs was followed by revolts from the Zem-
stvo (liberals, asking for constitutional monarchy), the Socialist Revolutionary
Party (opting for land distribution among peasants and an agrarian peasant
based revolution; included membership by many upper middle class and middle
class revolutionaries) and the Marxist Russian Social Democratic Labour Party
(opting for nationalization and Marxism with the idea of industry workers as the
revolutionary class). The first semistable solution was the creation of the State
Duma, satisfying the liberals. However, infiltration within the SRP by a police
spy led to its split into two parts, one joining the SRP and the other supporting
the second semi-stable stage – the creation of a provisional government in col-
laboration with the Duma and the socialists. The SDLP itself was divided into
Mensheviks and Bolsheviks based on their disagreement on membership policy
and whether Russian industrial workers were prepared to stage a revolution or
if such revolutions should be preceded by a bourgeois revolution.
In France, similar factions formed after the initial moves were made for lib-
eralization. Besides, Necker, Emmanuel-Joseph Sieys, who was a key provoker,
held a position in the a clergy, and hence was a member of the privileged class,
who had some noble blood, but was brought up a commoner. Although he
derided the old fashioned school of ideas, and was expelled from school once he
received his degree in theology and received a position within the clergy in spite
of his contradictory views by using powerful friends. This depicts the complex-
ity of the number of variables in interactions among individuals when optimal
bonds formed based on certain variables can give rise to overall friendship that
can be used to influence to procure a position in an opinion group regardless of
contradictory opinions in another variable. However, this position was later used
in bargaining for rights that went against the clergy. Pamphlets like Qu’est-ce
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que le tiers tat? eventually led to the clergy losing their privileged position.
Other instigators of the French revolution involved wealthy professionals.
The already existing strong bourgeois class in France was aware of international
trends. This was unlike in the case of Russia, where 83 percent of the population
comprised the peasant class and exchange of ideas at the international level was
concentrated within a small fraction that was able to move to the professional
class. After the revolution, the workers and the peasant were isolated from
international contact by nationalization, information was filtered and private
ownership or entrepreneurship was banned. In France, the peasant class did
not need to be part of a revolution to topple the monarchy, and the peasant
class was involved only after the revolutionaries took over. They fought against
the revolutionaries because of their favorable relationship with the clergy, since
religion was a part of their identity, and was later crushed brutally by the
revolutionaries. Moreover, the revolutionaries banned workers’ organizations.
France also saw several stages of semi-stable equilibria, starting with the
creation of a unified assembly, the fear of being persecuted by the army leading
to the assembly’s attempt in creating a new constitution and the fall of Bastille,
attempted defection of the Royal family, constitutional monarchy, then the fail-
ure of the constitutional monarchy making way to the ultimate execution of the
King and the Queen and for a reign of terror involving factions, and then the
creation of a directory. Such episodes of unstable identities in both Russian
and French histories involving the succession of power from one identity group
to another point to the processes of removal of unfavorable interactions and
sustenance against unfavorable states within a larger system with subgroups of
identities existing in a hierarchical manner. Strengths of each identity class,
bargaining power derived from skill correlated with them and mobility between
identity classes are also important and will be analyzed with respect to our
model in the next section.
Three specific points associated with the events in these revolutions are worth
analyzing before we move to the next section where we qualitatively formulate
our theoretical model.
The split of SR into supporters of the duma and supporters of Bolsheviks
show the importance of group identities in a large scale social movement and
how an ensemble of individuals with wide spectrum of views can be aggregated
within one identity class, where they are held together with group values they
adhere to but may not completely agree with. However, when one such group
dissolves, each member makes a choice to join the next possible best match
of group identity, which might push members from two ends of the opinion
spectrum within the same identity group into two conflicting groups, making
once friends bitter enemies.
Again, each country, consisting of social classes is placed in competition with
the rest of the world, especially other neighboring countries. When the Russian
revolution started, the French revolution had already taken place and Britain
was a crown monarchy. Many European nations were more industrialized than
Russia. However, Russia’s position within Europe made it necessary to start
shifting towards industrial scenarios, thus creating a working class that came in
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contact with city life and to some extent the international scenario. However, af-
ter the revolution, complete nationalization and overthrow of the entrepreneurs
made it possible to isolate the large population that was unaware of world trends
isolated again. Competition with he world was achieved by having a select few
people choose homogeneous policies for the entire country that was competi-
tive with respect to world progresses, making USSR pioneers in many fields of
science. Initial increase in living standards, compared to the commodities and
security available to the former working class and peasants helped overthrow
the non-Bolsheviks and created a large scale unified economy. However, de-
personification of the individual gave rise to high mortality rates, lack of goods
of individual choices within the country, and dissatisfaction, eventually leading
to Perestroika.
However, after Perestroika, a sudden introduction of the free market, with
not much of the infrastructure changed, posed the necessity of making choices
and decisions at a personal level in a competitive international market. To an
economy that had been closed for a long time, this resulted in considerable
chaos.
The last point to consider is the incompleteness of information regarding each
individual in an ensemble, where the individual himself is a complex array of
variables, leading to the uncertainty in strength and motives of another identity
class, and inertia associated with different levels of identities, especially when
the dynamics is fast. Initially, Nicholas was to be tried by the Bolsheviks, but
his entire family was murdered when the Tsar’s supporting white army was
heard to be approaching to rescue him. In France, King Luis XVI was executed
for treason, even after the country attempted constitutional monarchy, when
Austria, where Marie Antoinette came from, declared war, threatening to restore
the King. In France, the Tennis Court Oath took place because the assembly
members were unsure if the army, consisting of mostly hired foreigners, was
approaching to persecute them, giving rise to instability.
11.2 Theoretical Model of Interacting Hierarchical Iden-
tities
We use the analysis from the previous sections to propose a theoretical inter-
action based hierarchical identity model to be used later in conjunction with
detailed mathematical formulation:
1. Each agent consists of an array of a large number of variables in differ-
ent states. Each agent has also preference for environment states and material
goods. 2. Collaboration and need of skills make it necessary for agents to co-
operate and share. Hence all agents cannot have all needs satisfied.
3. Collaboration for different tasks is often based on and sometimes evokes
notions of similarity, and gives rise to identity classes within a society. These
classes may have various degrees of dynamics or overlap.
25
4. The top class of the hierarchy level, and the top person at a hierarchy
level has more of preferences satisfied.
5. Each person tries to reach the top. However, this is subject to his bar-
gaining power, ie. skills within his array of variables. If he has a specific skill
correlated with his individual qualities that is not found in other agents, or
other groups, he as a whole has a larger bargaining power, and can place him-
self higher.
6. Within a society, collaboration is needed for specific tasks making it
necessary or create identity groups. Groups need to be formed to challenge
an existing collaboration group to interact at a group level. Groups have group
bargaining power dependent on the skill and number of people within the group.
7. Group identity can depend on similarity of variables, sometimes genetic,
sometimes beliefs or other types. However, one agent may move to a different
group because of match of specific interest or skill, although that agent may
still identify with his group of origin.
8. Mobility of agents among groups, hence scale-wise hierarchical interaction
causes information leakage between classes. Often the position of an agent in
one group can be used to mobilize a different group the agent identifies with.
The mobility of an agent to a separate group is often by means of the skill vari-
ables needed within a group to maintain its bargaining power, and also due to
interactions in many weighted variables while local needs may make one variable
weighted (more important) at a time, though priorities may later shift. Shifting
of such priorities is subject to plasticity of the variable.
9. Shifting of power between groups may take place in stages with unstable
equilibrium points. Shifts depend on breaking unfavorable interactions and also
being able to sustain against other groups from a new position. Often the shift
starts with compromised joint positions between the top group and a group
closer to it, but as unrest persists, mobilized by shifts in identities in other
groups as well, dynamics persists, until favorable interaction scenarios subject
to balance between bargaining power and optimal interactions are reached.
1o. Some of the identity groups are stiff and some others are more flexible.
However, some degree of inertia and stages of dual identities can be observed in
most dynamical shifting. Also, identities can split, subject to changed interac-
tions. Trust and risk in isolating an agent’s identity or the number of agent’s
in an identity group may lead to extreme behavior.
In (Shafee 2009a) a quantitative formulation of some of these features is
shown based on hierarchical interactions among identity units in a complex
organization. The concept of a system consisting of interacting subsystems
dynamically approaching minima in an energy landscape is elaborated more
rigorously in that paper.
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12 Conclusions
We have discussed the various forms of identities that can originate due to in-
teracting variables in semi-closed systems on different scales. The introductions
of different levels of identity lead to new forms of economics more consistent
with real social behaviors which may often appear irrational. We have outlined
the possibility of developing concepts and relations related to the evolution of
social clusters, which are analogous to spin systems, and have indicated the
importance of the concept of the identity of each agent. Variable attributes,
which may be quantifiable, are specified to define levels of identity. We have
then used the concepts developed earlier in the paper to study the dynamics of
social clusters in specific cases and have graphically found some critical points in
the evolution of social clusters. More mathematical applications of the concept
may be able to predict of real social situations.
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